The clear and present danger

Regular readers would be aware of my views about Bangladesh’s current political situation.  We had a miliatry coup on 11 Jan 2007.  Any initial hope that the coupmakers were not like others that came before them quickly faded, and I am under no illusion about the true intentions of Gen Moeen his mates.  While Moeen’s minimum objective at the moment is indemnity against future retribution, beyond this, he would very much like to have a political presence (see here).  And behind him, the army seems to have developed corporate ambitions.   

I take the above as given, and analyse some scenarios.  More probable scenarios are presented first.  None of the scenarios augur well for us, but some pose lot bigger danger than others.  The more dangerous ones are presented later.  I argue that the possibility of a President Moeen armed with a National Security Council is the biggest danger we face. 

1. Upazilla election.

This looks like the most certain of all scenarios.  And there is a lot of speculation about these elections being used to create a bunch of Ayub-style Basic Democrats (see here for example).  But such speculation misses a number of things. 

Upazilla elections are not going to create Basic Democrats by themselves.  For that to happen, the constitution needs to be amended.  This, in turn, requires a two-third majority in the parliament.  This cannot be done without support from at least one, possibly both, political parties.  But if one or both parties are with Gen Moeen, then why does he need the Basic Democrats?

A related worry is that these elections will be used to bring in pro-regime people who will help rig the general election.  But if the regime can put their men as local mayors/chairmen, then what is stopping them from rigging the general election outright? 

Given all the other things Moeen could do entrench himself, this seems to me to be the most harmless scenario.  Plus, local government elections have their own benefits (see here).  Considering this, upazilla elections don’t seem to merit much of a concern.

2. The deal.

That some sort of understanding has been reached between Moeen and the Awami League chief is indisputable.  Presumably this deal involves Awami League being given every assistance possible to win the coming election, and the party rewarding Moeen upon victory.  The question is really about Moeen’s reward. 

If the reward is indemnity against future arrest and prosecution, then the full cover of Awami politics is probably the best Moeen can hope for. 

If this comes to pass, 1/11 will join the 1974 famine, Bakshal, 1986 summersault, Joinal Hazari, and logi-boitha as the staple of anti-Awami talking points.  It may create a rift between the party and its intellectual supporters.  Some grassroot activists may become disillusioned with the party.  All these will hurt the party badly in any future election. 

However, that is something for Awami Leaguers to worry about.  Let’s ask, how dangerous is a deal for the country? 

Not much it seems to me, with two caveats: first, as long as nothing more than Moeen’s personal safety is conceded to; and second, there is no countercoup (see below).  With these caveats, under this scenario, Moeen will very much be subservient to Awami League.  Will his status in the party be all that different from Shafiullah, Nuruddin Khan or Mustafizur Rahman? 

3. King’s party.

Until a few months ago, this seemed to be the likely ‘entry strategy’ for Moeen.  The idea is to create a party like Ershad’s Jatiya Party or various official Muslim Leagues of Pakistan.  This was speculated within weeks of 1/11: Zia’s Bangladeshi nationalism plus Dr Yunus plus spirit of 1971 create a formidable force that will be extremely difficult for AL to defeat in a presidential or even parliamentary election (details here). 

More recently, the strategy was described as: Create a splinter group of BNP whom the election commission would give the dhaner sheesh symbol. Float multiple smaller parties and create a loose coalition of Jatiyotabadi forces and civil society elements which will include this fake BNP with Ershad’s JP, Badruddoza’s BDB, PDP, Dr. Kamal Hossain’s Gonoforum etc. Ensure that this front gets at least 130 odd seats and a majority or at least enough to hold the balance of power  (details here).

But this effort seems to have failed because BNP’s grassroot is not willing to play ball.  In fact, it appears that even if Mrs Zia and her elder son are released, the party rank and file may not join with the general.  The only way this strategy could work is for Mrs Zia to actively go out and campaign for Moeen.  I just don’t see this happening.  I also suspect that her refusal to do so is why their release is being delayed.

But suppose I am wrong (I’ve been wrong about BNP’s politics in the past – I thought the 2001 alliance was a good idea, and had high hopes for Tarique Rahman), and this strategy does happen.  This will give the Awamis their biggest political opening since the late 1960s.  Whatever happens after the election, Moeen won’t have any more popular acceptance than Ershad.  A bad outcome for the country, but hardly a disaster.

4. Presidency with NSC.

Suppose President Iajuddin steps down under a shroud of corruption allegation (see here).  The Speaker then declines to take up the presidency.  All of a sudden there is a constitutional crisis.  Cabinet seeks guidance from the Supreme Court.  Pundits, including the framer of the constitution, is asked for expert opinions.  And all advise that the best way to resolve the crisis will be for Gen (by then retired, of course) Moeen U Ahmed to accept the presidency. 

When we are in the caretaker mode and there is a state of emergency, even a plain, non-expert, non-bhadralok biplob inspired reading of the constitution suggests that the president has extraordinary powers at his disposal.  While the incumbent has been absolutely docile, one shudders to think what Gen Moeen could do once in Bangabhaban.

He could put serving generals in key bureaucratic posts.  Retired generals are already in key poistions in institutions like Anti-Corruption Commission or the Election Commission.  They are also in the cabinet. 

More ominously, he could, with a simple executive order, and without any constitutional amendment, set up a National Security Council.   Drishtipat Writers’ Collective discusses the dangers NSC pose here.  The important point to stress here is that President Moeen, armed with an NSC, won’t have to contend with party politics.  Free from the needs of party politics, he could take a hardline against the party leaders. 

But even if allows a generally fair election, will that end our problems?  He will use the NSC as a bully pulpit and browbeat the next parliament to do his bidding.  At the least, he will force the parliament to guarantee his personal safety and the army’s corporate interests.  And even if there is a two-thirds majority against Moeen in the next parliament, will he do a B Chowdhury and simply walk away? 

Regardless of what happens in December, a Moeen presidency and an NSC will create more conflict.  This is a very clear and present danger.  This is what we should worry about.  We should discuss how this can be stopped.

5. Constitutional amendments.

Constitutional amendments have been discussed for a while.  And a constitutional review is perhaps not a bad idea.  There are strong arguments to repel Article 70 that bans floor crossing.  The whole concept of caretaker government might have to be reviewed.  But there is a danger that Moeen and his allies will try to amend the constitution to give the presidency extraordinary powers to dissolve parliament and depose prime ministers.

This is very dangerous.  But how likely is it?  How will the regime get the two-thirds vote necessary to amend the constitution?  As long as both parties remain opposed to any such amendment – and it’s hard to see why they would take such a suicidal step – how could the regime amend the constitution?

There is one possibility.  Suppose Moeen does become the president, and goes on hardline against the parties.  Essentially, he traps the parties into boycotting the election, gets himself a 1988 or Feb 1996 style parliament, and sets up a constitutional review commission that ‘brings about necessary amendments’ (see here).

Will the parties fall into that trap? 

6. Referendum.

A related possibility is to hold a referendum.  This is historically how dictators have tried to legitimise their power grabs.  Do you trust President Moeen U Ahmed to turn Bangladesh into a middle-income country by 2020?  Do you support the proposed constitutional amendments?   

Can the parties resist a referendum?  If they boycott the election because their leaders are exiled or jailed, will they be able to create a popular uprising?

The history of resisting elections is not very encouraging.  Even in 1988, with a full blown national uprising sparked by Nur Hossain’s murder and Lal Dighi massacres behind them, a widely unpopular dictator got away with his sham election.  In 1990, Ershad regime ended after a student-led uprising that made the army and bureaucracy switch sides.  And in 1996, it took a civilian coup to remove BNP from power. 

So my guess is that the parties will avoid the trap and join the election.  This means, while dangerous, constitutional amendments and referendum are probably not all that likely.  Or to put differently, joining the elections is the best way to fight these dangers. 

7. Countercoup.

This is the wild card.  If Moeen does become president, the country will end up in conflict.  If he takes the hard line, and the parties fall into the trap, we may not get a popular uprising, but we’d certainly get political violence.  What is to stop another ambitious general from ’saving us’ then?   Even if there is no political violence, with both parties joining the election and so on, we would still have a moment of reckoning with Moeen sometime in 2009 or 2010.  And during that constitutional crisis, what will stop another general from trying his luck? 

In fact, a poverty ridden country like ours, with the current global economic stagnation, is always on the knife’s edge, it’s always just one incidence away from a popular uprising like Kansat, Shonir Akhra or Dhaka University uprising of last year.  After a bunch of majors got away with killing the president and his family on 15 Aug 1975, every other officer in our army thought about saving the nation.  It took the blood of men like Khaled Musharraf, Haider, Taher, Zia and Manzur to rid us of that plague.  If coups become de jure again, a countercoup will become simply a matter of time.  I wonder how many lives will it cost to put the genie back in the bottle.