The Zia synthesis: foreign policy
Updated: 28 June 0950 BDT (the original post was incomplete).
Last May, I started a series on my understanding of the politics of synthesis initiated by Ziaur Rahman. The first installment was on politics and governance, while the second one was on society and economy. My main contention is that when things work in Bangladesh, they work along the path set by Zia, and they work because the politics of synthesis crafted by this military strongman turned popular politician had continued from the work of his predecessors, and his successors saw the merit in keeping them.
This theme of continuity is nowhere more present than in the realm of foreign relations. And yet, the political needs of the present era has resulted in deliberate obfuscation of Zia’s foreign policy by both his political heirs in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and their opponents in the Awami League.
The politics of synthesis: 30 years on
Ziaur Rahman, military strongman turned a very popular politician, was killed exactly 30 years ago today. Despite the twists and turns of politics, three decades from his death, when things actually work in Bangladesh, they work along the path set by Zia. And they work because the politics of synthesis crafted by Zia had continued from the work of his predecessors, and his successors saw the merit in keeping them.
In a five-part series, I show how the Zia synthesis still defines Bangladesh’s politics and governance, economy, society and culture, and foreign policy. Not in all aspects does this blog agree with the synthesis — the disapprovals are also pointed out. Finally, the series points out how along one crucial dimension, the Zia synthesis has completely been abandoned.
The discourse about Zia is dominated by lies of various degree. This series is a modest attempt at setting the record straight.
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